We present an efficient, optimally-resilient Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (ABA) protocol involving n = 3t + 1 parties over a completely asynchronous network, tolerating a computationally unbounded Byzantine adversary, capable of corrupting at most t out of the n parties. In comparison with the best known optimally-resilient ABA protocols of Canetti and Rabin (STOC 1993) and Abraham et al. (PODC 2008), our protocol is significantly more efficient in terms of the communication complexity. Our ABA protocol is built on a new statistical asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) protocol with optimal resilience. Our AVSS protocol significantly improves the communication complexity of the only known statistical and optimallyresilient AVSS protocol of Canetti et al. Our AVSS protocol is further built on an asynchronous primitive called asynchronous weak commitment (AWC), while the AVSS of Canetti et al. is built on the primitive called asynchronous weak secret sharing (AWSS). We observe that AWC has weaker requirements than AWSS and hence it can be designed more efficiently than AWSS. The common coin primitive is one IIT Madras, Chennai, prangan55@gmail.com of the most important building blocks for the construction of an ABA protocol. In this paper, we extend the existing common coin protocol to make it compatible with our new AVSS protocol that shares multiple secrets simultaneously. As a byproduct, our new common coin protocol is more communication efficient than all the existing common coin protocols.
Introduction
The problem of Byzantine Agreement (BA) was introduced in [23] and since then it has emerged as one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing. Informally, a (threshold) BA protocol allows a set of n mutually distrusting parties, each holding a private bit, to agree on a common bit, even though t out of the n parties may act in any arbitrary manner to make the remaining parties disagree. The BA problem has been investigated extensively in various models (see for example [2, 7, 15, 20] and their references). Studying the BA problem in an asynchronous setting is interesting, since an asynchronous network models a real-life network like the Internet more appropriately than a synchronous network. The problem of asynchronous BA (called ABA) has received relatively less attention in comparison to the BA problem in the synchronous setting. Unlike a synchronous network, there is no upper bound on the message delivery time in an asynchronous network and the messages can be arbitrarily (but finitely) delayed. The inherent difficulty in designing an asynchronous protocol is that it is impossible to distinguish between a slow but honest sender (whose mes- [7, 8] (1 − ) t < n/3 poly(n, 1 ) O (1) [1] A S T t < n/3 poly(n) O(n 2 ) ditioned on the event that all the (honest) parties terminate; this notion of expectancy is weaker than the usual notion of expectation, where the expectancy is over all possible events. An (1 − )-terminating ABA protocol may have non-terminating runs, where the (usual) expected running time will be infinite. Thus, our measure of ERT, also followed in [8, 7] , is with respect to the executions where the parties terminate (more on this later).
Based on the above parameters, the best known ABA protocols are summarized in Table 1 . Over a period of time, the techniques and the design approaches of ABA protocols have evolved spectacularly. Rabin [25] designed an ABA protocol assuming that the parties have access to a "common coin protocol", which allows the honest parties to output a common random bit with some probability (called the success probability). Bracha [6] presented a simple implementation of the common coin protocol, whose success probability is Θ(2 −n ). Feldman and Micali [12, 13] came up with a common coin protocol that has a constant success probability. The essence of [12] is the reduction of implementing the common coin to that of designing an asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) protocol. Informally, an AVSS protocol is a two phase protocol (sharing and reconstruction) carried out among the parties. The goal of an AVSS protocol is to allow a special party called dealer to share a secret s among the parties during the sharing phase in a way that would later allow for a unique reconstruction of the shared secret in the reconstruction phase, while preserving the secrecy of s until the reconstruction phase. Following [12, 13] , almost all the optimallyresilient ABA protocols including the protocols of [1, 8] , followed the same approach of reducing the ABA problem to that of AVSS. In this paper, we follow the same approach too.
Our contribution
We present an optimally-resilient, (1 − )-terminating ABA protocol with a private and broadcast communication of O(R n 4 log 1 ) bits for reaching agreement on t + 1 = Θ(n) bits 5 concurrently; where R is the ERT of the protocol. So the Table 2 Comparison of our optimally-resilient ABA protocol with the best known optimally-resilient ABA protocols; AST stands for almostsurely terminating. The communication complexity is the expected communication complexity as it depends on the ERT of the protocol. While the protocols of [1, 8] are designed for single bit inputs, our protocol handles multiple bit inputs. In this (expected) amortized communication complexity of our protocol, for reaching agreement on a single bit, is O(R n 3 log 1 ) bits of private, as well as broadcast communication. Moreover, conditioned on the event that our ABA protocol terminates, it does so in a constant expected time; i.e. R = O (1) . In Table 2 , we compare our ABA protocol with the best known optimally-resilient ABA protocols of [1, 8] .
On one hand, communication-complexity wise our ABA protocol improves over the ABA protocol of [8] by a large margin, while keeping all other properties in place (namely (1 − )-terminating and a constant expected running time). On the other hand, our ABA protocol enjoys the following merits over the ABA protocol of [1]:
1. Our ABA protocol is better in terms of communication complexity when log 1 < n 5 log n. 2. Our ABA protocol has a constant ERT whereas the ABA protocol of [1] has O(n 2 ) ERT.
On the negative side, our protocol is (1 − )-terminating, whereas the protocol of [1] is almost-surely terminating. We now briefly discuss the approaches used in the ABA protocols of [1, 8] , and the current article.
• The ABA protocol of Canetti [7] , Canetti and Rabin [8] uses the reduction of [12, 13] from ABA to AVSS; i.e. an AVSS protocol with n = 3t + 1 parties is constructed first. The authors in [8] followed the following route to design their AVSS protocol: ICP → A-RS → AWSS → Two&Sum AWSS → AVSS, where X → Y means that protocol Y is designed using the protocol X as a black-box and ICP, A-RS and AWSS stand for Information Checking Protocol, Asynchronous Recoverable Sharing and Asynchronous Weak Secret Sharing respectively. The final AVSS protocol is highly communication intensive as well as involved. The protocol incurs a private communication of O(n 9 (log 1 ) 4 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 9 (log 1 ) 2 log(n)) bits during the sharing phase; during the reconstruction phase, it incurs a private communication of O(n 6 (log 1 ) 3 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 6 (log 1 ) log(n)) bits. 6 The protocol allows a dealer to share a single secret and all the (honest) parties terminate the protocol with probability at least (1 − ).
• The ABA protocol of [1] followed the same reduction from ABA to AVSS as in [8] , except that a variant of AVSS called shunning (asynchronous) VSS (SVSS) is used in place of AVSS. SVSS is a weaker notion of AVSS: if all the parties behave correctly, then SVSS satisfies all the properties of AVSS without any error; else it enables some honest party to identify at least one corrupted party, whom the honest party "shuns" from then onwards. In [1] , an SVSS scheme is constructed building on a primitive called weak SVSS (W-SVSS). Notably W-SVSS is the "shunning" variant of the AWSS primitive, where the latter served as a building block for the AVSS protocol of [7, 8] .
The use of SVSS instead of AVSS in generating the common coin causes the ABA protocol of [1] to have O(n 2 ) ERT (intuitively this is because in the worst case it requires O(n 2 ) executions of the SVSS, so that every honest party shuns every corrupted party). The SVSS protocol allows the dealer to share a single secret and requires a private communication as well as broadcast of O(n 4 log(n)) bits.
• Although we follow the same approach of designing our ABA protocol from an AVSS protocol, we depart from the standard practice at several places:
1. We design a communication efficient, optimallyresilient AVSS protocol (i.e. with n = 3t + 1), taking a "shorter" route, namely ICP → AWC → AVSS, rather than following the route suggested in [8] . Here AWC stands for Asynchronous Weak Commitment. 2. While the AVSS protocols of [8] as well as of [1] (the shunning variant) used AWSS as the building block, we replace AWSS by AWC, a new primitive introduced in this paper. We find that AWC has "weaker" requirements than AWSS and can be designed more efficiently than the existing AWSS protocols (the details are elaborated in Sects. 2.3.3 and 4.3). Specifically, while the existing AWSS and W-SVSS are based on the idea of using bivariate polynomials of degree t in each variable, we design an AWC protocol based on Shamir secret sharing [27] and therefore using univariate polynomials of degree t; this immediately implies a gain of Θ(n) in the communication complexity. 3. We extend the existing notion of ICP [8] to deal with multiple verifiers simultaneously, instead of a single verifier (see Sect. 2.4). Informally, ICP allows to authenticate data in the presence of a computationally unbounded adversary and it serves as the "starting point" of our AVSS as well as the AVSS protocol of [8] . Our multiple-verifier ICP readily fits in our AWC protocol. In [8] , the (single-verifier) ICP was implicitly extended for multiple verifiers when it was used in the higher level primitives. Presenting ICP for multiple verifiers thus provides greater conceptual clarity when it is plugged into the next level primitive which is AWC in our case. Furthermore, our multiple-verifier ICP achieves better communication complexity than the existing single-verifier ICP extended to deal with multiple verifiers. 4. We design each of the above building blocks (i.e. ICP, AWC, AVSS) to deal with multiple values concurrently (unlike the existing protocols which are designed to handle only a single value). This leads to a significant gain in the communication complexity over executing multiple instances of the protocols dealing with a single value.
Combining the above results, we obtain an AVSS protocol that significantly improves over the only known optimally-resilient (statistical) AVSS of [8] and is of independent interest. Specifically, our AVSS protocol requires a private communication and broadcast communication of O(( n 2 + n 3 ) log 1 ) bits to share secrets concurrently, where ≥ 1. Moreover, it requires a broadcast communication of O(( n 2 + n 3 ) log 1 ) bits to reconstruct the secrets. 5. Finally, we make several changes to the existing common coin protocol. The best known common coin protocol of [7, 13] employs AVSS sharing a single secret. Informally, in the common coin protocol of [13] , each party is asked to act as a dealer and share n random secrets using n separate instances of an AVSS protocol. One can improve the communication complexity if the n instances of the AVSS (dealing with a single secret) are replaced by a single instance of an AVSS protocol which allows the dealer to share all the n secrets concurrently. When plugging our new AVSS protocol (sharing multiple secrets concurrently) for the same, we noticed that this "trivial" substitution leads to an "incorrect" common coin protocol. So we bring forth several modifications to the existing common coin protocol that allow us to use our AVSS protocol for sharing multiple secrets concurrently. As a result, our new common coin protocol is more communication efficient than the existing common coin protocol of [7, 8, 13] . Interestingly, the new common coin protocol is a multi-bit protocol, which allows the parties to generate t + 1 = Θ(n) random and independent common coins concurrently further leading to reach agreement on t + 1 bits concurrently.
Our multi-bit common coin protocol leads to an ABA protocol with an amortized private and broadcast communication of O(n 3 log 1 ) bits for reaching agreement on a single bit.
Organization of the paper:
In the next section, we describe the asynchronous network model and formally define ABA, AVSS, AWC, AWSS, asynchronous ICP (AICP), single and multi-bit common coin, followed by the description of the existing tools. In Sect. 3, we present our AICP, followed by our new primitive AWC in Sect. 4; in the same section, we also compare our AWC scheme with the best known existing AWSS scheme of [22] and the existing W-SVSS scheme of [1] . In Sect. 5, we present our AVSS scheme. In Sect. 6, we recall the existing common coin protocol from [7] and present our multi-bit common coin protocol. In Sect. 7, we recall the existing voting protocol from [7] , which together with the multi-bit common coin protocol implies our ABA protocol presented in Sect. 8.
Model and definitions
We consider an asynchronous network consisting of n parties, say P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, where each party is modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machine. We assume that each pair of parties are directly connected by a secure and authentic channel and t out of the n parties can be under the influence of a computationally unbounded Byzantine (active) adversary, denoted as Adv. Moreover, we assume n = 3t + 1. The adversary Adv, completely dictates the parties under its control and can force them to deviate from the honest behavior in any arbitrary manner during the execution of a protocol. The parties not under the influence of Adv are called honest or uncorrupted. The communication channels are asynchronous, having arbitrary, but finite delay (i.e the messages are guaranteed to reach their destinations eventually). Moreover, the order in which the messages reach their destinations may be different from the order in which they were sent. To model the worst case scenario, Adv is given the power to schedule the delivery of every message in the network. While Adv can schedule the messages of the honest parties at its will, it has no access to the "contents" of the messages communicated between the honest parties.
As in [7] , we consider a protocol execution in the asynchronous model as a sequence of atomic steps, where a single party is active in each such step. A party gets activated by receiving a message after which it performs an internal com-putation and then possibly sends messages on its outgoing channels. The order of the atomic steps are controlled by a "scheduler", which is controlled by Adv. At the beginning of the computation, each party will be in a special start state. We say a party has terminated/completed the computation if it reaches a halt state, after which it does not perform any further computation. A protocol execution is said to be complete if each (honest) party terminates the protocol.
Running time of an asynchronous protocol [8] . Consider a virtual "global clock", measuring the time in the network. Note that the parties cannot read this clock. Let the delay of a message be the time elapsed from its sending to its receipt. Let the period of a finite execution of a protocol be the longest delay of a message in the execution. The duration of a finite execution is the total time measured by the global clock divided by the period of the execution (infinite executions have infinite duration).
Let C be the event that the (honest) parties terminate the execution of a given protocol. The expected running time (ERT) of a protocol, relative to an adversary and some specific choice of the input values for the parties and conditioned on the event C, is the expected value of the duration of a complete execution (thus the expectancy is taken only over the random inputs of the parties in which the event C occurs). The (non-relative) expected running time R(π |C) of a protocol π , conditioned on C, is the maximum over all inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and adversaries Adv, of the expected running time of the protocol relative to the input x and adversary Adv and conditioned on the event C. That is:
where D(π, Adv, x, r ) is the duration of the execution of the protocol π with inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and random inputs r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) for the parties and with adversary Adv.
We next present the definition of ABA and the other related primitives. We note that all computation and communication in our protocols are done over a finite field F. Our ABA protocol is (1 − )-terminating, for a given > 0. Looking ahead, to bound the error probability of our ABA by , we select a finite field F = G F(2 κ ) for the minimum κ such that ≥
. Without loss of generality, we assume that n is polynomial in 1 ; i.e. n = poly( 1 ). So each element of F can be represented by O(κ) = O(log 1 ) bits.
Asynchronous byzantine agreement (ABA)
Definition 1 (ABA [8] ) Let π be an asynchronous protocol executed among the parties in P, where each party has a (private) binary input and a binary output. We say that π is a (1 − )-terminating ABA protocol for a single bit, for an allowed error parameter (with > 0) if the following hold for every possible Adv and every input vector of the parties:
1. Termination: If all the honest parties participate in the protocol then with probability at least (1 − ), all the honest parties eventually terminate the protocol. 2. Correctness: All the honest parties who terminate the protocol hold identical bit as the output. Moreover, if all the honest parties had the same input bit, say ρ, then all the honest parties output ρ upon termination.
The above definition can be easily extended for bits, where > 1 and we call such a protocol a multi-bit ABA protocol.
Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS)
An AVSS protocol consists of two sub-protocols: a sharing protocol (called Sh) where a special party called dealer shares a secret among the parties and a reconstruction protocol (called Rec) where the parties reconstruct the secret from their shares without any "help" from the dealer. Formally:
Definition 2 ({Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) [8] ) Let (Sh, Rec) be a pair of protocols for the n parties, where a dealer D ∈ P has a private input s ∈ F for Sh. Then (Sh, Rec) is a (1 − )-AVSS scheme, 7 for an allowed error parameter (where > 0), if the following requirements hold for every possible Adv:
-Termination: With probability at least (1 − ), the following requirements hold: We conclude with the following note:
Note 1 An alternate definition of VSS/AVSS requires that D's committed secret s belongs to F, instead of F ∪ {⊥} [17, 19] . However, Definition 2 is "equivalent" to this alternate definition, since in Definition 2 we can say that s ∈ F, by fixing a default value in F, which may be output in case the Rec protocol completes with a ⊥ output. A VSS satisfying the definition of [17, 19] is required when VSS serves as the building block for secure multi-party computation (MPC) [3] . On the other hand, VSS (AVSS) satisfying our definition is enough for the construction of (asynchronous) BA protocols. We also note that our definition of VSS was used in [21] to study the round complexity of VSS.
Definition 2 can be extended in a straight-forward way for a secret S = (s 1 , . . . , s ), containing elements from F.
AWSS and AWC
In this section, we first define AWSS, a "weaker" primitive than AVSS; we note that AWSS was used in [8] to design a (1 − )-AVSS and a "shunning variant" of AWSS was used in [1] to construct a shunning AVSS. We then introduce a new asynchronous primitive called AWC, which has weaker requirements than AWSS. We propose this new primitive as a "replacement" for AWSS in the construction of our (1 − )-AVSS. The section concludes with a comparison between AWSS and AWC, where we argue that indeed AWC has weaker requirements than AWSS.
Asynchronous weak secret sharing (AWSS)
An AWSS protocol consists of two sub-protocols: a sharing protocol (WSh), where the dealer shares a secret and a reconstruction protocol (WRec), where the parties reconstruct the shared secret. The Termination and the Secrecy conditions of AVSS (see Definition 2) remain the same for AWSS, except that Sh is replaced by WSh and Rec is replaced by WRec. The Correctness condition of AVSS also remains the same for AWSS for the case when D is honest; however, the Correctness condition is "weakened" in AWSS for the case when D is corrupted as follows:
If an honest party terminates WSh then a value, say s ∈ F ∪ {⊥} is fixed. Moreover, with probability at least (1 − ), each honest party will output either s or ⊥ at the end 9 of WRec.
Notice that the only difference between AVSS and AWSS is for the case when D is corrupted and the shared value s is not equal to ⊥; in this case while the parties in WRec may reconstruct ⊥, the parties in Rec will always reconstruct s.
Asynchronous weak commitment (AWC)
Informally, an AWC scheme consists of two protocols: a commitment protocol (called Com) and a decommitment protocol (called Decom). In the commitment protocol, a special party called Committer "commits" a secret to the parties in a distributed fashion. Later during the decommitment protocol, Committer "decommits/opens" the committed secret and the parties verify whether this was the secret committed earlier and accordingly either accept or reject the secret. Thus AWC can be viewed as a distributed version of the classical two-party commitment schemes [24] . Formally:
Definition 3 (Asynchronous weak commitment (AWC)) Let (Com, Decom) be a pair of protocols for the n parties, where a Committer ∈ P has a private input s ∈ F for Com (the secret to be committed). In the protocol Decom, Committer has a private input s (the secret to be decommitted) 10 and all the parties upon terminating Decom either output s or ⊥. Then (Com, Decom) is a (1 − )-AWC scheme, for an allowed error parameter (where > 0), if the following requirements hold for every possible Adv:
-Termination: With probability at least (1 − ), the following requirements hold: The above definition can be easily extended for a secret S = (s 1 , . . . , s ), containing elements from F.
Comparison between AWSS and AWC
The sharing protocol of AWSS and the commitment protocol of AWC achieves the same outcome, namely a distributed commitment to a unique value s, which remains private if D and Committer are honest. However, there is a subtle difference between the reconstruction protocol of AWSS and the decommitment protocol of AWC. Specifically, the difference is in the role that D and Committer plays respectively to ensure the termination of the respective protocols. The reconstruction protocol of an AWSS does not demand a "special" role by D to enforce the termination. So this protocol will always terminate, if it is invoked by the honest parties, even if D is corrupted and does not participate in the reconstruction protocol. On the other hand, the decommitment protocol demands a special role from Committer to enforce termination; here Committer has to invoke the protocol. So if Committer is corrupted and does not invoke the decommitment protocol, this protocol may never terminate. The above difference intuitively suggests that "more" communication/distribution of information to the parties may be called for during the sharing protocol of an AWSS scheme, as compared to the commitment protocol of an AWC scheme. The intuition is that the "additional" information may enable the honest parties to reconstruct the shared secret during the reconstruction protocol, even without the participation of the dealer. The intuition turns out to be right as we are able to design an AWC protocol that is more efficient than the known AWSS protocols (see Sect. 4.3).
Finally we note that both AWSS and AWC provides the same type of commitment. Namely if Committer is honest then it will decommit the committed secret and thus the secret will be accepted by the honest parties. On the other hand if Committer is corrupted, then it cannot commit s ∈ F and later decommit a different secret s ∈ F. Such an attempt by a corrupted Committer (in co-operation with the corrupted parties) will cause the honest parties to output ⊥.
Asynchronous information checking protocol (AICP)
An ICP is used for authenticating data in the presence of computationally unbounded corrupted parties. The notion of ICP was first introduced by Rabin and Ben-Or [26] . As described in [8, 11, 26] , an ICP is executed among three parties: a Signer, an intermediary INT and a Verifier. Informally, an ICP consists of two stages, implemented by different protocol(s):
-Signature-generation stage: it consists of two phases.
In the first phase, Signer computes its IC (information checking) signature on a secret s ∈ F, denoted by ICSig(Signer, INT, Verifier, s) and hands it to INT. Signer also computes some verification information for Verifier and hands it to Verifier. In the second phase, INT (in co-operation with Signer and Verifier) confirms whether indeed the received signature is a "valid" signature. -Signature-revelation stage: here INT reveals the signature ICSig(Signer, INT, Verifier, s), claiming that it has received it from Signer. Verifier then verifies the signature, using the verification information and either accepts or rejects the signature (and hence s).
An IC signature may be considered as the informationtheoretically secure variant of digital signatures. It provides properties like unforgeability and non-repudiation; in addition, it provides information-theoretic security of the secret. That is, if Signer and INT are honest, then at the end of signature-generation stage, a corrupted Verifier does not learn any information about s in the information-theoretic sense.
We extend the notion of ICP in two directions: Firstly, we consider multiple verifiers, where each party in P acts as a Verifier. Looking ahead, the multiple-verifier ICP concept readily fits in our AWC protocol; note that Signer and INT can be any two parties from the set P. Secondly, instead of a single secret, we consider ICP that can deal with multiple secrets concurrently; later this allows to achieve better communication complexity, than executing multiple instances of ICP, dealing with a single secret. Our ICP is executed in the asynchronous setting and thus we call it AICP.
Definition 4 ((Multi-verifier) Asynchronous Information
Checking Protocol (AICP)) An AICP involves three entities: a Signer ∈ P, an intermediary INT ∈ P and the set of parties P acting as verifiers. The protocol is carried out in three phases, each implemented by a different subprotocol:
1. 
Single and multi-bit common coin
We now give the definition of common coin protocol, followed by the extension to multi-bit common coin protocol.
Definition 5 (Common coin [7] ) Let π be an asynchronous protocol, where each party in P has a random input and a binary output. We say that π is a (1 − )-completing, tresilient, p-common coin protocol, for a given , where > 0, if the following requirements hold for every possible input of the honest parties and every possible Adv:
-Termination: If all the honest parties participate in π , then with probability at least (1 − ), all the honest parties terminate the protocol. -Correctness: For every possible value σ ∈ {0, 1}, with probability at least p, all the honest parties output σ .
Definition 6 (Multi-bit common coin) Let π be an asynchronous protocol, where each party in P has a random input and an output of bits. We say that π is a (1 − )-completing, t-resilient, p-multi-bit common coin protocol, with an output of bits, for a given error parameter , where > 0, if the following requirements hold for every possible input of the honest parties and every possible Adv:
-Termination: If all the honest parties participate in π , then with probability at least (1 − ), all the honest parties terminate the protocol. -Correctness: For every l = 1, . . . , , all the honest parties output σ l as the lth bit with probability at least p for every σ l ∈ {0, 1}. 15 
Existing tools
Asynchronous Broadcast: This primitive, called A-cast, was introduced and implemented by Bracha [6] with 3t + 1 parties. Formally, A-cast is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (A-cast [8] ) Let π be an asynchronous protocol initiated by a Sender ∈ P, having an input m (the message to be broadcast). We say that π is an A-cast protocol if the following requirements hold, for every possible Adv:
-Termination:
1. If Sender is honest and all the honest parties participate in the protocol, then each honest party eventually terminates the protocol. 2. Irrespective of the behavior of Sender, if any honest party terminates the protocol then each honest party eventually terminates the protocol.
-Correctness: If the honest parties terminate the protocol then they do so with a common output m . Furthermore, if Sender is honest then m = m.
In Fig. 1 , we recall the Bracha's A-cast protocol from [7] ; the protocol incurs a private communication of O( n 2 ) bits to broadcast an bit message [7] . In the rest of the paper, we use the following terminologies while using the A-cast protocol:
Terminology 1 (Terminologies for using the A-cast protocol). We say that: 15 Thus, the probability p is associated with each individual bit.
1. "P i broadcasts m" to mean that P i acts as a Sender and invokes an instance of A-cast to broadcast m. 2. "P j receives m from the broadcast of P i " to mean that P j (as a receiver) completes the execution of P i 's broadcast (namely the instance of the A-cast protocol where P i is Sender), with m as the output.
Randomness extraction [4, 5] : In our common coin protocol, we use a well known method for "extracting" randomness with information-theoretic security. The setting is as follows: let a 1 , . . . , a N ∈ F, such that at least K out of these N values are selected uniformly at random from F; however, the exact identities of those K values are not known. The goal is
of which is uniformly distributed over F. This is achieved as follows: let f (x) be the polynomial of degree at most
we require |F| ≥ N + K to make the technique work; in our protocols, N , K and |F| will be such that this relationship will be true). 
Asynchronous information checking protocol
We present an AICP called MultiVerifierAICP, which is a (1 − μ)-AICP, 16 where μ =
and is the number of secrets on which the signature is generated. Let the secret input of Signer be S = (s 1 , . . . , s ) ∈ F . The underlying idea behind the protocol is as follows: During the generation phase, Signer selects a polynomial F(x) of degree at most +t −1, which is an otherwise random polynomial such that F(β i ) = s i , for i = 1, . . . , . Here β 1 , . . . , β are publicly known distinct elements from F. The polynomial F(x) is given to INT. In addition, Signer gives the value of F(x) at a random evaluation-point α i (different from all β j 's) to each verifier P i . During the revelation phase, INT discloses F(x) (by broadcasting) and each verifier P i checks whether the value held by him is indeed the value of F(x) at α i .
An AICP with the aformentioned generation and revelation phase, and with a void verification phase, already satisfies the AICP-Correctness3 property. Specifically, if Signer is honest and INT is corrupted, then INT will not know the evaluation-point α i of an honest verifier P i and so with high probability, INT cannot disclose an incorrect polynomial F (x), different from F(x), and still remain unno- ticed by an honest verifier P i . The above AICP further satisfies the AICP-Secrecy property, as the degree of F(x) is at most +t −1 and at most t points on F(x) will be disclosed to Adv; so Adv will lack additional points on F(x) to uniquely interpolate F(x) and obtain the value of F(x) at β 1 , . . . , β (which are the secrets). More specifically, from the viewpoint of Adv, who holds t random points on a polynomial of degree at most + t − 1, there exists a polynomial that will be "consistent" with those t random points and any secrets. As we disclose below, the above AICP, however, does not achieve the AICP-Correctness2. Specifically if Signer is corrupted, then he might give F(x) to INT, but evaluations of a different polynomial F(x) to each honest verifier, where
A verification phase, allowing interaction among Signer, INT and the verifiers is thus incorporated to bar Signer from doing the above. The interaction should be in a "zero-knowledge" fashion, meaning that it should not compromise the privacy of the information held by INT and the (honest) verifiers.
To enable the zero-knowledge interaction, Signer distributes some additional information to INT and the verifiers during the generation phase. Specifically, in addition to F(x), Signer gives to INT another random polynomial R(x) of degree at most + t − 1. In parallel, to each individual verifier P i , Signer gives the value of R(x) at α i . Now the specific details of the zero-knowledge consistency checking, along with the other formal steps are given in Fig. 2 .
We now prove the properties of the protocol MultiVerifierAICP. We begin with the following two supporting claims.
Claim 1 Let F(x), R(x) be two polynomials of degree at most +t −1 and (α
Then for a random d ∈ F\{0}, the condition B(α i ) = dv i + r i will be true except with probability at most
Proof We first argue that there exists only one non-zero d ∈ F, for which the condition B(α i ) = dv i + r i will hold, even though F(α i ) = v i and R(α i ) = r i . For otherwise, assume there exists another non-zero e ∈ F, where e = d, for which 
Proof From Claim 2, if Signer and INT are honest, then Signer will broadcast the OK message during Ver, as v i = F(α i ) and r i = R(α i ) will be true for each verifier P i ∈ R and there are at least t + 1 honest verifiers in R. Now during RevealPublic, INT will broadcast ICSig = F(x) (so F (x) = F(x)) and each honest verifier P i ∈ R will broadcast the Accept message, as the condition C1, i.e. v i = F(α i ) will hold for each of them. Hence each honest verifier P i ∈ P will eventually receive t +1 Accept messages from at least t + 1 verifiers in R and hence will output Reveal i = S . Now it is easy to see that S = S.
Lemma 2 (AICP-Correctness2) If Signer is corrupted and
INT is honest, holding ICSig(Signer, INT, P, S) at the end of Ver, then except with probability at most n |F|−1 , all honest verifiers will output Reveal i = S at the end of RevealPublic.
Proof We first claim that except with probability at most 1 |F|−1 , an honest verifier P i ∈ R will broadcast the Accept message during RevealPublic, in response to ICSig(Signer, INT, P, S) broadcasted by the honest INT; so except with probability at most |R| · 1 |F|−1 ≤ n |F|−1 , all the honest verifiers in R will broadcast Accept. Now since there are at least t + 1 honest verifiers (and at most t corrupted verifiers) in the set R, it implies that each honest verifier P i ∈ P will eventually receive the Accept message from at least t + 1 different verifiers in R and will output Reveal i = S. We now prove our claim by considering the following two cases, depending upon what Signer broadcasts during Ver:
1. Signer broadcasts a polynomial F(x) during Ver: In this case, the claim is true, as INT will set ICSig(Signer, INT, P, S) = F(x) as the IC signature and each honest verifier P i ∈ R will set v i = F(α i ) as its verification information at the end of Ver. During RevealPublic, the honest INT will broadcast ICSig(Signer, INT, P, S) = F (x) = F(x) and so the condition C1, namely F (α i ) = v i will hold for each honest verifier P i ∈ R. 2. Signer broadcasts the OK message during Ver: In this case, INT will broadcast ICSig(Signer, INT, P, S) = F (x) = F(x) during RevealPublic. Now we have the following cases depending on the relationship between
Here also P i will broadcast the Accept message, as the condition C2, i.e. B(α i ) = dv i + r i will hold for P i . To make an honest verifier P i ∈ P output Reveal i = S at the end of RevealPublic, where S = S, it must be the case that INT revealed incorrect ICSig during RevealPublic. More specifically, INT must have broadcasted an incorrect polynomial F (x) during RevealPublic, that evaluates to the elements of S at x = β 1 , . . . , β . We now claim that if INT does so, then except with probability at most +t−1 |F|− , an honest verifier P i ∈ R will broadcast the Reject message during RevealPublic; so except with probability at most |R| ·
|F|− , all the honest verifiers in R will broadcast Reject. As there can be at most t corrupted verifiers in the set R (who may broadcast the Accept message in response to the incorrect polynomial), this implies that no honest verifier in the set P will output S . We now prove our claim by considering the following two cases, based on the broadcast of the honest Signer during Ver:
1. Signer broadcasts the polynomial F(x) during Ver: This implies that B(α i ) = dv i + r i does not hold for all the verifiers P i ∈ R during Ver. So clearly the condition C2 will not hold for any honest verifier P i ∈ R during RevealPublic. An honest verifier P i ∈ R can therefore broadcast the Accept message under the condition C1, 
We show that in this case, the conditions under which an honest verifier P i ∈ R would broadcast the Accept message (in response to the polynomial F (x) = F(x)) during RevealPublic are either impossible or may happen with probability at most
As discussed above, this can happen with probability at most 
. , s ( ) ).
Proof If Signer and INT are honest, then Signer will broadcast the OK message during Ver. Without loss of generality, let the verifiers P 1 , . . . , P t ∈ P be under the control of Adv. At the end of Ver, Adv will know d and the polynomial B(x) = d F(x) + R(x), as they are broadcasted. In addition, Adv will also know α i and
However, the degree of the polynomials F(x) and R(x) is at most + t − 1 and the two polynomials are independent of each other. It is easy to see that d, 
In the rest of the paper, we will use the following terminologies while using the protocol MultiVerifierAICP.
Terminology 2 (Terminologies for using the Gen, Ver and RevealPublic protocols) Recall that Signer and INT can be any party from the set P. We say that:
1. "P i gives ICSig(P i , P j , P, S) to P j " to mean that P i as a Signer executes the protocol Gen(P i , P j , P, S), considering P j as an INT, to give its IC signature on S. 2. "P i receives ICSig(P j , P i , P, S) from P j " to mean that P i as an INT has completed the protocol Ver(P j , P i , P, S) and holds ICSig(P j , P i , P, S), where P j is Signer. 3. "P i reveals ICSig(P j , P i , P, S)" to mean that P i as an
INT executes RevealPublic(P j , P i , P, S) for revealing ICSig(P j , P i , P, S) and hence S, where P j is Signer, while the verifiers in P participate in the instance of RevealPublic. 4. "P k completes the revelation of ICSig(P j , P i , P, S) with output Reveal k = S (resp. Reveal k = ⊥)" to mean that P k as a verifier has completed the protocol RevealPublic(P j , P i , P, S), where P j is Signer and P i is INT, with output Reveal k = S (resp. Reveal k = ⊥). 5. "P i successfully/correctly revealed ICSig(P j , P i , P, S) (and hence S)" to mean that every honest verifier P k ∈ P outputs Reveal k = S after completing RevealPublic(P j , P i , P, S), where P i is INT and P j is Signer. 6. "P i failed to reveal ICSig(P j , P i , P, S) (and hence S)" to mean that each honest verifier P k outputs Reveal k = ⊥ after completing RevealPublic(P j , P i , P, S), where P i is INT and P j is Signer.
Asynchronous weak commitment (AWC)
We present an AWC scheme, which is a
and is the number of secrets committed in the scheme. For the ease of presentation, we first present an AWC scheme which allows to commit and decommit a single secret (i.e. = 1). This is followed by the modifications required to deal with secrets concurrently. Next, we compare our AWC scheme with the existing AWSS and W-SVSS schemes. We conclude with an important interpretation of our AWC on committing and decommitting polynomials (instead of committing and decommitting a secret as it is projected now). The interpretation plays a crucial role when AWC is plugged in the AVSS scheme.
AWC scheme for a single secret
We present an AWC scheme called AWC-Single, consisting of a pair of protocols (Com, Decom), which allows a Committer ∈ P to commit a secret s ∈ F in a distributed fashion among the parties in P. The high level idea of the protocol is as follows: During the protocol Com, Committer computes n Shamir-shares [27] for the secret s, with threshold t. Specifically, Committer selects a random polynomial of degree at most t, subject to the condition that the constant term of the polynomial is the secret s. Let Sh 1 , . . . , Sh n be the n shares of s, which are nothing but n distinct evaluations of the polynomial. Then Committer sends the ith share Sh i to the party P i . On receiving the share Sh i from Committer, party P i "acknowledges" by signing Sh i and giving ICSig(P i , Committer, P, Sh i ) to Committer.
To avoid endless waiting (due to asynchronicity), on receiving the signatures from n − t = 2t + 1 parties, Committer broadcasts the identities of these 2t + 1 parties (we denote these parties by the set WCORE) and every (honest) party terminates Com on receiving WCORE from Committer. At this stage, Committer has committed a secret determined by the shares of the (honest) parties in WCORE. Specifically, let f (x) be the polynomial, defined by the shares 17 of the honest parties in WCORE. Then, the committed secret, say s, is the constant term of f (x) (thus belongs to F) if the polynomial is of degree at most t, else s = ⊥.
If Committer is honest then the protocol Com preserves the privacy of the secret s; this follows from the privacy of Shamir secret-sharing and the secrecy property of the AICP. Furthermore, protocol Com terminates since every honest party in the set of at least 2t + 1 honest parties will be eventually included in WCORE. The committed secret s is the same as the secret input s of the honest Committer. Now consider the case when Committer is corrupted. In that case, it may not distribute "consistent" Shamir-shares to the honest parties in WCORE. More specifically, the shares given to the honest parties in the set WCORE may not lie on a unique polynomial of degree at most t, so the committed secret s may be ⊥. However, as discussed in the sequel, during the protocol Decom, a corrupted Committer cannot decommit any s different from the committed secret ⊥.
In the protocol Decom, Committer reveals the signatures of all the 2t + 1 parties in the set WCORE on the corresponding shares. So the participation of Committer is very crucial in the protocol Decom, as otherwise, the honest parties will never participate and terminate the protocol Decom. A corrupted Committer might thus choose to let Decom never complete. Now if all the signatures (on the shares) are revealed correctly by Committer and the 2t + 1 shares lie on a unique polynomial of degree at most t, then the constant term of the polynomial is output as the decommitted secret; otherwise the parties output ⊥. The interpretation is that Committer wants to decommit the secret, say s , which is the constant term of the polynomial, defined by the 2t + 1 shares (corresponding to the parties in WCORE), that are revealed by Committer (along with the corresponding signatures). If these shares define a polynomial of degree at most t, then s is the constant term of the polynomial (thus belongs to F); otherwise s = ⊥.
It is easy to see that an honest Committer will successfully reveal the required signatures, leading to a decommitment of s. On the other hand, a corrupted Committer can only successfully reveal the signature on the same share Sh i , which it had given to an honest party P i ∈ WCORE during Com (follows from the AICP-Correctness3 property of AICP). This implies that if s ∈ F is the decommitted secret then with high probability, s is the same as secret s, committed during Com. That is, the constant term of the polynomial defined by the shares of the honest parties in WCORE (namely s) in Com is s . 18 Without violating the properties of the protocol, we add few additional steps in the protocol Com. These additional steps do not play any role for the AWC scheme, but they are crucial to our AVSS scheme (described in the next section) that is built on AWC scheme. Firstly, while distributing Sh i to party P i , the Committer signs the share and gives ICSig(Committer, P i , P, Sh i ) to P i . To distinguish these signatures from the ones described before, we use the following notations: (1) The signatures ICSig(P i , Committer, P, Sh i ), given by the shareholders P i to Committer are called primary signatures.
(2) The signatures ICSig(Committer, P i , P, Sh i ), given by Committer to the share-holders P i are called secondary signatures. Secondly, (Sign − Sent, , ) and (Sign− Received, , ) messages are broadcasted by the share- 18 Note that there are at least t + 1 honest parties in WCORE and thus the shares of the honest parties in WCORE uniquely define a single polynomial of degree at most t.
holders and Committer respectively, after giving and receiving the primary signatures. The formal details of AWC-Single are given in Fig. 3 .
We now prove the properties of AWC-Single.
Lemma 5 (Termination) Protocols (Com, Decom) satisfy the termination condition of Definition 3 without any error.
Proof If Committer is honest then eventually it will receive ICSig(P i , Committer, P, Sh i ) from every honest P i , where Sh i = Sh i and there are at least 2t + 1 such honest parties. So eventually, Committer will broadcast a set WCORE and the corresponding (Sign − Received, , ) messages and by the properties of broadcast, every honest party will eventually receive the set and the messages. Moreover, the honest Committer also must have received the message (Sign − Sent, i, Committer) from the broadcast of every party P i ∈ WCORE, before including P i in the set WCORE and so from the properties of broadcast every other honest party will also eventually receive these messages and will terminate the protocol Com. This proves the first requirement.
Let P i be an honest party who has terminated Com. Thus P i has received the set WCORE of size 2t + 1 and the required (Sign − Received, , ) messages from the broadcast of Committer, along with the message (Sign − Sent, j, Committer) from the broadcast of every P j ∈ WCORE. Now from the properties of broadcast, every other honest party will also eventually receive this set and the corresponding messages and will terminate Com. This proves the second requirement. Now we show that if Committer is honest then every party will terminate Decom. The claim is trivially true since an honest Committer will invoke the protocol Decom and reveal the signature ICSig(P j , Committer, P, Sh j ) corresponding to each P j ∈ WCORE. Irrespective of whether Committer has revealed the signatures successfully or not, every party will terminate the protocol eventually.
It is left to show that if Committer is corrupted and some honest party, say P i , terminates Decom, then every other honest party eventually terminates the protocol. From the protocol steps, it follows that P i must have completed the revelation of ICSig(P j , Committer, P, Sh j ), corresponding to every P j ∈ WCORE with some output Reveal i . From the protocol steps of RevealPublic, every other honest party will also eventually complete the revelation of these ICSigs and hence will terminate the protocol Decom. This concludes the proof of termination. Proof First we show that if some honest party terminates Com, then there exists a committed secret s ∈ F ∪ {⊥}. The secret s is defined as follows: if the shares of the honest parties in WCORE lie on a unique polynomial of degree at most t, say f (x), then s = f (0), otherwise s = ⊥. Note that s is well defined, as there are at least t + 1 honest parties in WCORE and the condition that some honest party terminated Com ensures that every honest party in WCORE has received its share from Committer. We next define s , the input for Committer during the protocol Decom (namely the value for decommitting): s is the constant term of the polynomial, defined by the 2t + 1 shares, which are revealed by Committer during the protocol Decom; if the polynomial has degree at most t, then s ∈ F, otherwise s = ⊥. Now we consider the following two cases (depending upon the behaviour of Committer):
-Committer is honest: In this case, s = s = s. This is because, the 2t + 1 shares which Committer reveals during Decom are the points on the original polynomial f (x), selected by Committer during Com. In this case, Committer will successfully reveal the signature corresponding to every party in WCORE, except with probability at most tμ ≤ δ, where μ = nt |F|−1 (for every honest party in WCORE, the claim is true without any error due to AICP-Correctness1; for every corrupted party in WCORE, the claim is true due to AICP-Correctness2, except with probability μ; the rest follows from the fact that there can be at most t corrupted parties in WCORE). So except with probability at most δ, all the honest parties will output s upon terminating Decom. This proves the first requirement.
-Committer is corrupted: we show that if Committer tries to decommit s , where s = s, then except with probability at most δ, all the honest parties will output ⊥ upon terminating Decom. To decommit s = s, it must be the case that during Decom, Committer reveals Sh j as the share on the behalf of at least one honest party P j ∈ WCORE, such that Sh j is different from the share Sh j , which Committer has given to P j during the Com protocol. However, if Committer does so, then except with probability at most μ, Committer will fail to reveal ICSig(P j , Committer, P, Sh j ) due to AICPCorrectness3. Now there are at least t + 1 honest parties in WCORE and so except with probability at most |WCORE| · μ ≤ δ, Committer will fail to successfully reveal the IC signature on any incorrect share on the behalf of any honest party in WCORE. This proves the second requirement of the correctness property. 
AWC scheme for secrets
The AWC scheme presented in the last section allows to commit and later decommit a single secret. Now let the secret be a vector S = (s 1 , . . . , s ), consisting of elements from F, where > 1. We can execute one "dedicated" instance of the Com and Decom protocol for each element s l ∈ S; this will require a private as well as broadcast communication of O( n 2 log 1 ) bits. However, we now show how to commit and decommit all the elements of S concurrently, so that it requires a private as well as broadcast communication of O(( n + n 2 ) log 1 ) bits. So if = Ω(n) (which will be the case when AWC is plugged in our AVSS scheme and the common coin protocol) then the broadcast communication of our protocol will be O( n log 1 ) bits, instead of O( n 2 log 1 ) bits. This is a significant gain in the communication complexity, considering the fact that implementing broadcast through the A-cast protocol over a point-to-point network is very expensive. 19 We extend the protocol Com and Decom in a "natural" way to deal with values concurrently. Firstly, Committer computes Shamir-sharings, one corresponding to each s l ∈ S. Secondly the instances of Gen, Ver and RevealPublic in the Com and Decom protocol are invoked to deal with values concurrently, instead of a single value. The modified protocols are presented in Fig. 4 . The new scheme is called AWC-Multiple, as it deals with multiple secrets. The properties of AWC-Multiple follow using the same arguments as for the earlier scheme: more specifically, the argument for termination is exactly the same as in Lemma 5. The correctness property follows similarly. Specifically, the vector of secret committed by Committer is defined by the vector of Shamir-shares of the honest parties in WCORE, while the vector of secret decommitted by Committer is defined by the vector of Shamir-shares corresponding to the parties in WCORE revealed by Committer (along with the signatures). Finally the secrecy is argued as follows. We observe that each element of S is independently Shamir-shared with threshold t; moreover the vector of Shamir-shares of the honest parties remain private during the generation of primary and secondary signatures on them, thanks to the secrecy property of AICP. We state the following theorem; the communication complexity of AWC-Multiple follows from the properties of the protocol and the communication complexity of our AICP (Theorem 1). The best known AWSS scheme was presented in [22] . The scheme is a (1 − )-AWSS scheme and is based on the idea of using a bivariate polynomial to share a secret. Specifically, to share a secret s, a random bivariate polynomial F(x, y) with s as the constant term is used and each party receives n points on this polynomial (along with additional information like the IC signatures). So this approach inherently requires the distribution of Ω(n 2 ) elements from F to share a single secret. On the other hand, in our AWC scheme, to commit a secret, only n elements from F need to be distributed, as the secret is shared using a univariate polynomial. This clearly suggests a gain of Ω(n) in the communication complexity. The weak-shunning VSS (W-SVSS) of [1] , which may be considered as a "shunning" variant of AWSS, is based on the idea of using a bivariate polynomial of degree t in each variable to share the secret (however, it does not use any IC signature) and so it also requires distributing Ω(n 2 ) elements from the underlying field to share a single secret. Moreover, W-SVSS does not satisfy all the properties of AWSS. Specifically, if all the parties behave honestly during the protocol then we get the same properties as in an AWSS scheme; else the protocol ensures that there exists at least one honest party, who will shun (ignore communication from) at least one corrupted party from then onwards for the rest of the protocol execution. Property wise, W-SVSS is incomparable to AWC.
Theorem 3 Protocols
(Com, Decom) is a (1 − δ)-
AWC for sharing polynomials
An interesting interpretation of the computation done in the protocol AWC-Single and AWC-Multiple is presented below; this interpretation is very crucial for understanding how the AWC is used later in our AVSS scheme. For simplicity, we present the discussion with respect to AWC-Single (Fig. 3) ; the discussion for the protocol AWC-Multiple (Fig. 4) 
) = f (x) (see the proof of Lemma 6); furthermore the view of the adversary will be independent of f (0) (see the proof of Lemma 7). We can recast the entire computation (during the protocol Com) in terms of Committer committing a polynomial f (x) instead of a secret s. Essentially, we now consider f (x) instead of s as the input of Committer, while rest of the protocol steps remain the same. Similarly, we can recast the computation in Decom in terms of Committer decommitting a polynomial. Namely, if the polynomial f (x) reconstructed in Decom has degree at most t, then all the (honest) parties output this polynomial; moreover the same polynomial was committed during Com. If the polynomial has degree more than t or the same polynomial was not committed during Com, then the parties output ⊥.
We remark that the above idea of abusing the notion of "committing (decommitting) a secret" to "committing (decommitting) a polynomial f (x) of degree at most t" is not new and it is commonly used in the literature of WSS and VSS (for example, see [16, 19, 21] ).
Following the above discussion, in the rest of the paper, we will "abuse" the notion of committing and decommiting secrets (through AWC) and instead say that Committer commits and decommits polynomials (in the sense explained above) using the Com and Decom protocols. More specifically, we will use the following terminologies:
Terminology 3 (Terminologies for using AWC to commit/decommit polynomials) Recall that Committer can be any party in the set P. We say that:
"Committer commits f 1 (x), . . . , f (x)" to mean that
Committer invokes Com(Committer, P, ( f 1 (0) , . . . , 
. If the honest parties terminate the protocol, then they either output f 1 (x), . . . , f (x), if these polynomials are of degree at most t and the same polynomials were committed earlier by Committer, during the Com protocol; otherwise the parties output ⊥.
Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS)
We present a (1 − γ )-AVSS scheme, where γ =
and is the number of secrets shared in the scheme. For the ease of presentation, we first present an AVSS scheme for sharing a single secret. Later we will brief the modifications needed for the multi-secret version.
AVSS for sharing a single secret
Our AWC schemes (AWC-Single and AWC-Multiple) readily give "honest dealer" AVSS schemes where Committer takes the role of the dealer D. Saying differently, they offer all the properties an AVSS scheme provides when D is honest. On the contrary, our AWC schemes are not AVSS schemes when a corrupted Committer takes the role of the dealer. There are two reasons for that: the third requirement of the termination condition (that informally says that the termination of the reconstruction protocol is not controlled by the corrupted dealer) and the second requirement of the correctness condition (that informally says that nothing but the committed secret is reconstructed) of AVSS are violated. In this section, we build our AVSS based on the idea of sharing the secret using a bivariate polynomial of degree t in each variable. The idea of bivariate-polynomial based secret sharing is not new and has been widely used in the literature of VSS in the synchronous setting (for example, see [11, 16, 17, 19, 21] and their references). The same idea was also used in [1] to design a shunning-VSS (SVSS). Our contribution for AVSS is the way we plug in our AWC scheme in the AVSS scheme. Thus far, almost all the existing VSS protocols are in general constructed from AWSS (AWC has been differentiated from AWSS in Sect. 2.3.3 where we argued that AWC has weaker requirements than AWSS and hence can be designed more efficiently). In what follows, we provide a brief background about symmetric bivariate polynomials, which are used in our protocol.
Bivariate polynomials:
A symmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y) over F of degree t is a polynomial over two variables, each of degree at most t, where F(x, y) has the following form:
which implies that r i j = r ji , for i, j = 1, . . . , t. Notice that
, which follows from the symmetry of the bivariate polynomial. Notice that the knowledge of f i (x) provides t +1 distinct points on the polynomial F(x, y); i.e. given f i (x), one can compute f i ( j) = F( j, i), for j = 1, . . . , t +1. This immediately implies that given any t + 1 distinct f i (x) polynomials, one can efficiently compute F(x, y), as the knowledge of t + 1 such distinct polynomials provides (t+1)(t+2) 2 distinct points on F(x, y), which are sufficient to interpolate F(x, y).
Looking ahead, the following important property of the bivariate polynomials will be used to prove the secrecy of our AVSS schemes: let s ∈ F be the secret and F(x, y) be a random, symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t, subject to the condition that s = F(0, 0). Then given only t distinct polynomials f i (x), where f i (x) = F(x, i) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, no information is revealed about s in the information-theoretic sense; intuitively this is because the knowledge of t such distinct f i (x) polynomials provides (t
− 1 points on F(x, y), which is one less than the number of coefficients in F(x, y). We will later formalize this intuition, while proving the properties of our AVSS. We now discuss the underlying ideas used in our AVSS.
Informal description of our AVSS: First, consider a simple scheme as follows: A dealer D, on having an input secret s, selects a random, symmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y) of degree t, subject to the condition F(0, 0) = s. For i = 1, . . . , n, D sends the polynomial f i (x) = F(x, i) to the party P i and we call f i (x) as the share of s for the party P i . The distribution of information as above does not violate the secrecy of s for an honest D. Next, assume that the parties can agree on a common "defining" set ShVCORE of at least n − t = 2t + 1 parties, who have received their shares from D. Based on the shares received by the parties in ShVCORE, we define the committed secret s as follows: if there exists a unique, symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t, say F(x, y), such that for every honest P j ∈ ShVCORE, it holds that f j (x) = F(x, j) (we will often say that the share f j (x) lies on F(x, y) if this condition is satisfied), where f j (x) is the share of P j , then we say that D has committed s = F(0, 0) during the sharing protocol; otherwise we say that D has committed s = ⊥. 20 Now further assume that the share f j (x) of each P j ∈ ShVCORE is "shared" among the parties in such a way that the following requirements are met:
(R1) If P j is honest, then f j (x) can be reconstructed back robustly; (R2) If P j is corrupted and s = ⊥, then either the correct share f j (x) or ⊥ (and nothing else) can be reconstructed back, even without any help from P j . 21 The above described scheme readily gives an AVSS. Namely if s = ⊥, then the shares of all honest parties in ShVCORE can be reconstructed robustly; moreover corresponding to the corrupted parties in ShVCORE, either the correct share or ⊥ can be reconstructed. All together, these reconstructed shares will give s. For s = ⊥, irrespective of what is reconstructed for the corrupted parties P j ∈ ShVCORE, the shares of the honest parties in ShVCORE can be reconstructed robustly, which along with the other reconstructed shares will output ⊥. We next discuss how to find an ShVCORE and how to make an agreement on it among the parties. We employ the following idea to find an ShVCORE: each party P j on receiving its share f j (x) from D acts as a Committer and commits f j (x) by invoking an instance of Com (this is where we use the notion of committing a polynomial through AWC); we denote the instance of Com (resp. Decom) executed on behalf of the party P j as Com j (resp. Decom j ) and the instance of WCORE constructed during Com j as WCORE j . A corrupted P j is prevented from committing an incorrect share f j (x) different from f j (x) in the instance Com j via a trick supported by the "symmetric" property of the bivariate polynomials. Specifically, let f j (i) be the AWC-Share (of the polynomial f j (x)) for the party P i that it is supposed to receive 20 Notice that s is well defined, as there will be at least t + 1 honest parties in ShVCORE, each holding a univariate polynomial of degree at most t as a share, which are sufficient to define a symmetric, bivariate polynomial of degree t. This is analogous to AWC, where the shares of the parties in WCORE defined the committed univariate polynomial. 21 If s = ⊥, then we do not bother what is reconstructed back for a corrupted P j ∈ ShVCORE.
from the Committer P j in the instance Com j ; ideally for an honest P j (and D), the condition f j (i) ? = f i ( j) should be true where f i (x) denotes the share of s (as received by P i from D). So we enforce that a party P i participates in the instance Com j only if its AWC-share is "consistent" with the share received from D, namely f j (i) ? = f i ( j) should hold. We refer this checking as pre-verification and stress that the purpose of executing Com j (coupled with this preverification) is not to provide any "new" information about f j (x) to the parties, but rather to prevent a corrupted P j from committing an incorrect share. Once the parties commit their received shares, the parties then try to find a common set of at least 2t + 1 committers ShVCORE, such that each committer P j ∈ ShVCORE has committed its share to at least 2t + 1 parties within ShVCORE; i.e. the condition |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1 holds for each committer P j ∈ ShVCORE. Looking ahead, we note that the condition |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1 plays a key role to ensure (R1) and (R2) as desired. Now, notice that if D is honest then ShVCORE with the above properties is sure to exist. An immediate possibility is the set of all honest parties. The questions that remain to be settled are: (1). How to find out such a set of committers and how the parties agree on such a common set, if it exists? (2). How (R1) and (R2) can be met? We next discuss how these issues are addressed.
We put on D the job of finding ShVCORE and making the parties agree on the same. Specifically D keeps a "track" of all such P j whose instance of Com j is (locally) terminated by D and as soon as D finds 2t + 1 such P j , it assigns them as a "potential" ShVCORE. Some subtleties arise as the condition |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1 has to be met for each P j ∈ ShVCORE. Namely, the "first" 2t + 1 parties whose Com instances have been terminated might not satisfy this condition. The way out is that D and the other parties should not "immediately" terminate an instance Com j after receiving a "valid" WCORE j from the Committer P j ; rather they dynamically "update" ShVCORE and WCORE j by including new "qualified" parties in these sets using the (Sign − Sent, , ) and the (Sign − Received, , ) messages, which are broadcasted in the Com protocol. The process of updating is repeated till D finds a potential set of committers ShVCORE with the desired overlap in the corresponding WCORE j s and broadcasts the same, after which the parties terminate the sharing protocol. The idea is that if D is honest, then eventually every honest party will be included in the WCORE of every other honest party (provided D dynamically updates the WCOREs as above beyond its recommended size of 2t + 1) and there are at least 2t + 1 honest parties and so D will eventually find the desired set of committers.
We now briefly sketch the reconstruction protocol where (R1) and (R2) are met. The reconstruction protocol consists of two main steps. First, we weed out a number of corrupted parties from ShVCORE based on several tests and assign the rest of the parties in RecVCORE. Second, the information published by the parties in RecVCORE is used to reconstruct the share of every party in ShVCORE, satisfying (R1) and (R2). More concretely, a three-stage test that every party P j in ShVCORE must pass is as follows: First, as a committer, P j ∈ ShVCORE must decommit a polynomial f j (x) (and not ⊥) in Decom j ; second, P j should successfully reveal the secondary signature ICSig(P k , P j , P, f k ( j)) received from committer P k for every P k in ShVCORE such that P j ∈ WCORE k 22 ; third, f k ( j) as revealed above as a part of IC signature should be the same as f j (k) ( f j (x) is the decommitted polynomial). If P j ∈ ShVCORE fails the three-stage test then it is discarded.
An honest P j ∈ ShVCORE will pass the three-stage test, due to the correctness property of AWC, the correctness property of AICP for the case of an honest INT and the enforcement of pre-verification mentioned earlier. As soon as |ShVCORE|−t non-discarded committers have been found, we denote the set by RecVCORE. The information revealed by the committers in RecVCORE is then used to reconstruct the committed shares of all the committers in ShVCORE, satisfying (R1) and (R2). The rest of the details appear in the formal description of protocol AVSS-Single presented in Fig. 5 .
We now prove the properties of AVSS-Single. Proof If D is honest, then f i ( j) = f j (i) will hold for every pair (P i , P j ) of honest parties, which implies that every honest party will eventually participate in the Com instance of every other honest party. This implies that D will eventually include every honest party P i in the instance WCORE j corresponding to every honest P j . This is because D (and the parties) do not immediately terminate the instance Com j after receiving a WCORE j of size 2t +1 from Committer P j in the instance Com j . Now every honest party will be eventually included in the set T and so D will eventually find an ShVCORE ⊆ T of size at least 2t + 1, such that |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1 holds for every P j ∈ ShVCORE. So D will eventually broadcast ShVCORE and WCORE j s corresponding to every P j ∈ ShVCORE. By 22 Recall that during Com k , the Committer P k would have received the primary signatures {ICSig(P j , P k , P, f k ( j))} from the parties P j ∈ WCORE k , while every P j ∈ WCORE k would have received the secondary signature ICSig(P k , P j , P, f k ( j)) from the Committer P k . The secondary signatures were not used in the Decom protocol of the AWC scheme; we will now use them, while executing the Decom instances in the reconstruction protocol of AVSS.
the properties of broadcast, every honest party will eventually receive these sets from the broadcast of D. Moreover, every honest party will eventually receive the desired (Sign − Sent, , ) and (Sign − Received, , ) messages, as D received them while constructing ShVCORE. So every honest party will eventually terminate the protocol Sh. This proves the first requirement. Let P hon be the first honest party who have terminated Sh. This implies that P hon have received the set ShVCORE of size at least 2t + 1 and the sets WCORE j s corresponding to every P j ∈ ShVCORE from the broadcast of D and verified that |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1. By the properties of broadcast, every other honest party will also eventually receive these sets which are verified consequently. Party P hon must have received all the desired (Sign − Sent, , ) and (Sign − Received, , ) messages from the broadcast of the corresponding parties before terminating Sh. The properties of broadcast imply that every other honest party will also eventually receive the same messages and will eventually terminate the protocol Sh. This proves the second requirement.
If the honest parties terminate Sh, then they know a set ShVCORE of size at least 2t+1, with at least |ShVCORE|− t honest parties in it. During the protocol Rec, each honest party (in ShVCORE) will honestly perform all the steps required during decommitting the share; namely except with probability at most δ, it will be able to decommit its share, which is a univariate polynomial of degree at most t, where δ = n 2 t |F|−1 (follows from the correctness property of AWC, substituting = 1). Moreover each such honest party will be able to correctly reveal any secondary signature (which it is required to), except with probability at most μ, where μ = nt |F|−1 (follows from the properties of AICP, substituting = 1). So even if the corrupted parties in ShVCORE do not perform their steps correctly during the Rec protocol, the honest parties from ShVCORE will be eventually included in the set RecVCORE, except with probability at most |ShVCORE| · δ ≤ n 3 t |F|−1 . It is now easy to see that once the set RecVCORE is constructed, every honest party will eventually output either an s ∈ F or ⊥ and hence will terminate Rec. This proves the third requirement.
Lemma 9 (Secrecy) If D is honest then the information received by Adv till the end of Sh is distributed independently of the secret s.
Proof Let C be the set of parties under the control of Adv, where |C| ≤ t and D ∈ C. So Adv will know the shares f i (x), where P i ∈ C. We first claim that throughout the protocol Sh, the adversary obtains no extra information other than these shares. During the instance Com i corresponding to an honest party P i , Adv will obtain at most t AWC-shares of the share f i (x). These t AWC-shares are already known to Adv, as these can be computed from the shares of the t parties in C. The secrecy property of Com ensures that the information revealed to Adv during Com i is independent of f i (0) and hence no new information about the share f i (x) is revealed to Adv during Com i . We now show that given only the shares of the corrupted parties in C, no information about the secret s = F(0, 0) is revealed to Adv. The proof follows from the properties of symmetric bivariate polynomials of degree t, as given in [10] ; for the sake of completeness, we recall the proof in the sequel.
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that from the view-point of the adversary, for every possible secret s ∈ F, there are same number of symmetric bivariate polynomials F(x, y) of degree t, with s = F(0, 0), such that F(x, y) is consistent with the shares received by Adv during Sh; i.e. f i (x) = F(x, i) holds for every P i ∈ C. We proceed to do the same in the following.
The polynomial h(x) has degree at most t, where h(0) = 1 and h(i) = 0, for every P i ∈ C. Now define the bivariate polynomial
Note that Z (x, y) is a symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t and Z (0, 0) = 1 and z i (x)
de f = Z (x, i) = 0, for every P i ∈ C. Now if during the protocol Sh, D in reality has used the polynomial F(x, y), then for every possible s, the information (namely the shares) held by Adv is also consistent with the polynomial
Indeed F(x, y) is a symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t and for every P i ∈ C,
and
Thus there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the consistent polynomials for the shared secret s and those for s and so all secrets are equally likely from the view-point of the adversary. Proof Let P hon be the first honest party to terminate Sh; this implies that P hon has received the set ShVCORE of size at least 2t + 1 and the corresponding WCORE j s from D and verified that |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE j | ≥ 2t + 1 for every P j ∈ ShVCORE. Let H be the set of honest parties in ShVCORE, so |H| ≥ |ShVCORE| − t ≥ t + 1. Notice that each party P i in H has committed the same share f i (x), as received from D. We define the committed secret s, committed by D as follows: if there exists a unique symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t, say F(x, y) , such that f i (x) = F(x, i) holds for every P i ∈ H (recall that this means that the shares of the parties in H lie on F(x, y) ), then s = F(0, 0); otherwise s = ⊥. It is easy to see that if D is honest, then s = s, as F(x, y) = F(x, y) in this case. We next show that each honest party upon terminating Rec will output only s with probability at least 1 − γ ; we consider the following two cases, depending upon whether D is honest or corrupted:
1. D is honest: we first observe that if there exists a corrupted P j ∈ ShVCORE, then the share f j (x) committed by P j during Com j is the same as f j (x), where f j (x) = F(x, j) and F(x, y) is the polynomial selected by D. This is because each honest party P i ∈ WCORE j must have pre-verified that the AWC-share f j (i) received from P j during Com j satisfies the condition f j (i) = f i ( j) before participating in Com j (namely exchanging the primary and secondary signatures); here f i (x) denotes the share of s received by P i from D. Moreover, there are at least t + 1 such honest party P i in WCORE j , whose f i ( j) uniquely define the share f j (x) of P j (follows from the properties of symmetric bivariate polynomials) and so
We next claim that during Rec, the share f k (x) computed on the behalf of a party P k ∈ ShVCORE is the same as f k (x) = F(x, k), except with probability at most δ, where δ = n 2 t |F|−1 ; this will further imply that s = F(0, 0) will be output, except with probability at most |ShVCORE|·δ ≤ n 3 t |F|−1 . There are two cases:
, as the (correctness) property of AWC ensures that if Committer is honest, then the polynomial (of degree at most t) committed by it during the Com protocol, will be obtained as the output during Decom. On the other hand, if P k is corrupted, then also f k = f k (x), except with probability δ; this is because the (correctness) property of AWC ensures that if Committer is corrupted and the output of Decom is a polynomial of degree at most t, then except with probability δ, the same polynomial was committed during the Com protocol. Moreover, as discussed above the polynomial committed by a corrupted P k ∈ ShVCORE during Com k is the same as
In this case, f k (x) is computed by interpolating the points {( j, f k ( j))}, where P j ∈ (RecVCORE ∩ WCORE k ) and P j (correctly) revealed the secondary signature ICSig(P k , P j , P, f k ( j)) on the AWC-share f k ( j), which was given to P j by P k during the instance Com k . Moreover the revealed f k ( j) lies on the share f j (x), where f j (x) is computed as the (decommitted) share on the behalf of P j during Rec; i.e. f k ( j) = f j (k) holds. We first notice that there will be at least t + 1 such interpolating points {( j, f k ( j))}. This follows from the fact that P k ∈ ShVCORE implies that during Sh, the condition |ShVCORE ∩ WCORE k | ≥ 2t + 1 was true and at least t +1 of these common parties (which were present in ShVCORE as well as in WCORE k ) will be present in RecVCORE. This is because RecVCORE ⊂ ShVCORE with |RecVCORE| = |ShVCORE| − t. Now we have already shown in the previous case that the share f j (x) computed on the behalf of each P j ∈ RecVCORE is the same as the original share f j (x) except with probability δ;
D is corrupted:
If s = F(0, 0), then the proof is exactly the same as for the case when D is honest. Now let us consider the case when s = ⊥, which implies that the shares of the parties in H do not lie on a unique symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree t. We show that except with probability at most δ, the share of each party P k in H will be computed correctly during the protocol Rec and so except with probability at most |H| · δ ≤ n · δ, every honest party will output ⊥, irrespective of the shares which are computed on behalf of the corrupted parties in ShVCORE.
If P k ∈ RecVCORE, then the above claim is true, as in this case, the share f k (x) computed on the behalf of P k is obtained as the output of Decom k and the correctness property of AWC ensures that for an honest Committer, the committed polynomial will be obtained correctly during Decom. If P k ∈ RecVCORE, then also the claim is true, as in this case f k (x) computed on the behalf of P k is obtained by interpolating the points {( j, f k ( j))}, where P j ∈ (RecVCORE ∩ WCORE k ) and P j has (correctly) revealed the secondary signature ICSig(P k , P j , P, f k ( j)) on the AWC-share f k ( j), which was given to P j by the Committer P k during the instance Com k . The AICP-Correctness3 property ensures that each revealed point {( j, f k ( j))} indeed lies on the original polynomial f k (x), which was committed by P k during Com k , except with probability at most μ, where μ = nt |F|−1 (by substituting = 1); as there can be at most n such interpolating points (on the behalf of P k ), f k (x) = f k (x) will be true, except with probability at most nμ ≤ δ. (Sh, Rec) is a (1 − γ ) Proof During the protocol Sh, D distributes n univariate polynomials of degree at most t as shares and n instances of Com are executed. During the protocol Rec, at most n instances of Decom and at most n 2 instances of RevealPublic are executed. The proof now follows from Theorem 1 by substituting = 1, Theorem 2 and from Lemmas 8-10.
Theorem 4 Protocols

AVSS for sharing secrets
A simple way to share and later reconstruct a vector of secrets S = (s 1 , . . . , s ), consisting of elements from F, where > 1, is to execute a dedicated instance of the Sh and Rec protocol for each element s l ∈ S; this will require a private as well as broadcast communication of O( n 3 log 1 ) bits. We next show how to share and reconstruct all the elements of S concurrently, so that it requires a private as well as broadcast communication of O(( n 2 +n 3 ) log 1 ) bits. For = Ω(n), the broadcast communication of our protocol will be then O( n 2 log 1 ) bits, instead of O( n 3 log 1 ) bits. This is a significant gain in the communication complexity, considering the fact that communication-wise, implementing broadcast through the A-cast protocol over a point-to-point network is expensive.
The underlying idea is to "extend" the AVSS scheme for sharing a single secret to deal with secrets concurrently in a "natural" way, similar to what was done earlier for the AWC. More specifically, D selects a random symmetric bivariate polynomial F l (x, y) for sharing each s l ∈ S and computes
and distributes these shares. But now, instead of executing different instances of Com to commit ith shares, party P i executes a single instance of Com to commit all the polynomials (shares) concurrently. The rest of the protocol steps of AVSS-Single are modified in the same way, so as to deal with shares concurrently. The modified protocols are presented in Fig. 6 . The new scheme is called AVSS-Multiple, as it deals with multiple secrets. The properties of the modified scheme follow using the similar arguments as for the earlier scheme.
We state the following theorem, stating the communication complexity of the protocol AVSS-Multiple, whose proof follows from the properties of the protocol and the communication complexity of our AICP (Theorem 1) and AWC (Theorem 3). (Sh, Rec) is a (1 − γ ) 
Theorem 5 Protocols
Existing single-bit common coin and our multi-bit common coin
This section starts with the description of the existing common coin protocol from [7] for generating a single common coin based on any AVSS scheme sharing a single secret. With the goal of constructing a more efficient common coin protocol, we substitute the AVSS scheme in the existing common coin protocol by AVSS-Multiple. This step requires an additional technique to surpass the issues arising from the fact that individual secrets are not allowed to be reconstructed in AVSS-Multiple and the reconstruction of a single shared secret leads to the reconstruction of all the secrets shared in the scheme. We further propose a trick that allows to generate n−2t = Θ(n) random 23 common coins concurrently with no additional communication. Thus, our protocol is a multi-bit common coin protocol. Looking ahead, our multi-bit common coin protocol leads to an ABA protocol that allows to agree on Θ(n) bits concurrently.
Existing common coin protocol
Let (Sh, Rec) be a given AVSS scheme, for sharing and reconstructing a single secret. The existing common coin protocol [7] , referred as CC, consists of two stages. In the first stage, each party acts as a dealer and shares n random secrets, using n distinct instances of Sh. The ith secret shared by each party is "associated" with the party P i . Once a party P i terminates any t + 1 instances of Sh, corresponding to t + 1 secrets associated with P i , it broadcasts the identities of the dealers, who have shared those t + 1 secrets. We say that these t + 1 secrets are attached to P i and later these t + 1 secrets are reconstructed to compute a "value", say V i , that will be associated with P i . During the second stage, after terminating the Sh instances corresponding to all the secrets attached to a party P i , party P j is sure that a fixed (yet unknown) value is attached to P i .
A more efficient multi-bit common coin protocol
Our AVSS scheme AVSS-Single that claims the best known communication complexity for sharing a single secret, readily gives a common coin protocol that improves over the communication complexity of protocol CC by a factor of 24 Ω(n 6 ). Our demonstration in Sect. 5.2 shows that sharing n secrets using a single instance of AVSS-Multiple is "cheaper" by a factor of n, than using n dedicated instances of AVSS-Single. Thus, we can get an even more efficient common coin protocol, by plugging in a single instance of AVSS-Multiple for each party, capable of handling n secrets, in the protocol CC. However, this replacement raises a subtle difference in the execution of CC. In CC, the secrets were reconstructed in an "on-demand" basis and so the secrets shared by a party are reconstructed independently of each other at different point of time as and when they are needed to be reconstructed. On contrary, in the modified CC (where AVSS-Multiple is used), concurrent reconstruction of all the secrets shared by a party is unavoidable, because AVSS-Multiple "ties up" all the shared secrets and supports concurrent sharing and reconstruction of all the shared secrets. In what follows, we demonstrate that the adversary can take the concurrent reconstruction to its advantage and completely "bias" the output of the common coin protocol.
More concretely, let P k be an honest party, who shares S k = (x k1 , . . . , x kn ) in CC using AVSS-Multiple. Now the adversary can schedule the messages in the protocol in such a way that a "situation" is created where a particular secret, say x ki alone, needs to be reconstructed, leading to the invocation of the reconstruction protocol of AVSS-Multiple. This leads to the adversary learning the entire vector S k . This allows the 24 If we use AVSS-Single in protocol CC, then the resultant common coin protocol will incur a private communication of O(n 5 log 1 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 5 log 1 ) bits, as Θ(n 2 ) instances of AVSS-Single are invoked. adversary to bias the value V j attached to an honest party P j by fixing the secrets to be shared by the corrupted parties 25 corresponding to P j . Thus, V j s of some of the honest parties are no longer random values. As a result, one of the crucial lemmas in the correctness proof of the protocol CC is not true anymore for the modified CC, which in turn, leads to a biased and adversarially chosen output in the common coin protocol. Below, we recall the lemma statement verbatim.
Lemma 11 ([7])
In the protocol CC, once an honest party P j receives the message (Attach T i to P i ) from the broadcast of P i and adds P i to the set G j , then a unique value, say V i , is fixed such that the following holds:
1. All the honest parties will associate the value V i with P i , except with probability at most n .
V i is distributed uniformly over [0, . . . , u] and is independent of values associated with the other parties.
To foil the attack described above, we employ a technique that prevents a corrupted party to share its secret vector via the sharing protocol of AVSS-Multiple after it learns the secret 25 Recall that the jth secret of each party's vector can contribute to decide V j .
vector of any honest party. 26 Lastly, we employ a trick in our common coin protocol that allows to output = n −2t = t + 1 = Θ(n) common coins (instead of a single coin), without requiring any additional communication from the parties. We denote the resultant protocol by MCC to emphasize that it is a multi-bit common coin protocol.
The high level idea of MCC: First, we note that CC can be converted to a multi-bit common coin protocol by asking each party to "attach" itself with 2t + 1 secrets, each from a different dealer, in Step 5 of CC. That is, instead of ensuring that |T i | = t + 1, party P i ensures that |T i | = 2t + 1. This can be enforced without any harm, as there are at least 2t + 1 honest parties who will be eventually included in T i of every honest party P i . This step enables to associate n − t values, instead of a single value V i , with a party P i via an application of the randomness extraction algorithm EXT. Next, we introduce/modify some of the steps of protocol CC to foil the attack of biasing the output of common coin protocol:
M1. In step 4, a party P i includes P j in T i after it is confirmed that n − t parties have terminated the instance Sh j . M2. In step 7, party P i upon confirming that |S i | = 2t + 1, broadcasts a Reconstruct Enabled message, indicating that it is "ready" to participate in the relevant Rec instances. However, only after receiving the Reconstruct Enabled message from n − t parties, it actually starts participating in the corresponding Rec instances. M3. As soon as P i broadcasts Reconstruct Enabled, it stops participating in the Sh instances of all the parties, which are not present in its T i set at that stage. Thus, if P j ∈ T i , then P i stops participating in the instance Sh j and later resumes its participation in Sh j only if P j is included in T i .
We now argue that protocol MCC which incorporates the above changes is not vulnerable to the attack discussed earlier. The argument is made in three clear steps, each relying on a different step (i.e. either on M1 or M2 or M3). Let P j be a corrupted party, who wants to select and share its secret vector S j after seeing the reconstructed secret vector of some honest party. Such a P j have to delay its sharing instance (namely Sh j ) until at least 2t + 1 parties broadcast the Reconstruct Enabled message (due to M2). This implies that at least t + 1 honest parties, say H , who broadcast Reconstruct Enabled message are yet to terminate Sh j at the time they initiated the broadcast. Therefore, the parties in H stop participating in Sh j from then onwards (due to M3). So P j cannot enter into T i of any honest P i . This is because for P j to enter T i of any honest P i , the instance Sh j must be terminated by at least 2t + 1 parties (due to M1) which must include one party from the set H . 27 However, no party from H will ever terminate Sh j , as they stopped participating in Sh j . Protocol MCC is now presented in Fig. 8 . We now proceed to prove the properties of the protocol MCC. Most of the properties of MCC follow from the properties of the protocol CC given in [7] . For the sake of completeness, we will present them here. As in [7] , while proving the properties, we assume that the following event E occurs: the invocations of Sh and Rec have been "properly" completed. This means that if an honest party has terminated an instance of Sh, then a vector S of n values is fixed, such that each honest party will eventually complete the corresponding instance of Rec and output S. Moreover, if the dealer of this instance of Sh is honest, then S is the vector of n values, which he has shared on behalf of the n parties. It is easy to see that the event E occurs with probability at least 1 − nγ (as there are n instances of AVSS), where γ = n 3 (n+t−1) |F|−n (follows from Theorem 5 by substituting = n). This implies that the event E occurs with probability at least 1 − 4n . 28
Lemma 12
Conditioned on the event E, all the honest parties terminate the protocol MCC in a constant time.
Proof We structure the proof in the following way. We first show that assuming every honest party has broadcasted the message Reconstruct Enabled, every honest party will terminate the protocol in a constant time. Then we show that there exists at least one honest party who will broadcast the Reconstruct Enabled message. Consequently, we prove that if some honest party broadcasts the Reconstruct Enabled message, then eventually every other honest party will do the same.
So let us prove the first statement. Assuming every honest party has broadcasted the Reconstruct Enabled message, it will hold that eventually every honest party P i will receive n − t such messages from the broadcast of n − t honest parties and will start participating in the Rec k instances corresponding to each P k ∈ T i . Now it clear that if a party P k is included in the set T i of an honest P i , then P k will be also eventually included in the set T j of every other (honest) P j . Hence if P i participates in Rec k , then eventually every other honest party will do the same. Now given that the event E occurs, all invocations of Rec terminate in a constant time. Also the protocol for the broadcast terminates in a constant time. This proves the first statement.
We next show that there exists at least one honest party, say P i , who will broadcast the Reconstruct Enabled message. First notice that till P i broadcasts the Reconstruct Enabled message, every honest party will keep participating in all the instances of Sh. By the termination property of Sh, every honest party will eventually terminate the Sh instance of every other honest party. Moreover, there are at least n − t honest parties. So from the protocol steps, it is easy to see that for the honest P i , the set T i will eventually contain at least n − t parties and hence P i will eventually broadcast the message (Attach T i to P i ). Similarly, every honest party P j will be eventually included in the set G i and 28 Since the field F is selected such that ≥
, where will be the error probability of our ABA protocol, we have that so G i will eventually contain at least n − t parties and hence P i will broadcast the message (P i Accepts G i ). Similarly, the set S i will be eventually of size n − t and hence P i will broadcast the Reconstruct Enabled message. Now we show that once the honest P i broadcasts the Reconstruct Enabled message, every other honest party P j will also eventually do the same. It is easy to see that every party that is included in T i will be also eventually included in T j . And hence, all the conditions that are satisfied for the honest P i above will be eventually satisfied for every other honest P j . So P j will eventually broadcast the Reconstruct Enabled message.
The following important lemma shows that in the protocol MCC, the adversary strategy discussed earlier for biasing the distribution of the value associated with a party, is not applicable. Proof Let P k be the first honest party who receives the Reconstruct Enabled message from at least n −t parties and starts participating in the Rec instances, corresponding to each party in T k . To prove the lemma, we first assert that a corrupted party P j will be never included in the set T i of any honest P i , if P j selects and shares its secrets after P k started participating in the Rec instances corresponding to the parties in T k . We prove this by contradiction.
Lemma 13 Let a corrupted party P j is included in
So let P k received the Reconstruct Enabled message from the parties in the set B 1 , where |B 1 | ≥ n −t. Moreover, assume that P j executes the instance Sh j only after P k received the Reconstruct Enabled message from the parties in B 1 . Furthermore, assume that P j is included in the set T i of some honest P i . Now P j ∈ T i implies that P i must have received the message (P m terminated j) from the broadcast of at least n − t parties P m , say B 2 , which implies that the (honest) parties in B 2 have terminated the instance Sh j and there are at least t + 1 such honest parties in B 2 . Now |B 1 ∩ B 2 | ≥ n − 2t and thus there exists at least one honest party, say P α , who is present in B 1 as well as in B 2 , as n = 3t + 1. This implies that the honest P α ∈ B 1 must have terminated the instance Sh j before broadcasting the Reconstruct Enabled message; otherwise P α ∈ B 2 would have stopped participating in the instance Sh j and would never broadcast the message (P α terminated j). This is because during the step 8(b) of the protocol, P α would have stopped participating in the instance Sh j while broadcasting the Reconstruct Enabled message if P α has not already terminated the instance Sh j . This further implies that P j must have executed the instance Sh j (which the honest P α have completed) before P k started participating in the Rec instances. But this is a contradiction to our assumption.
Hence if the corrupted P j is included in T i of any honest P i then it must have invoked the instance Sh j before any honest party started participating in any Rec instance. Thus while choosing its own secrets for the instance Sh j , the corrupted P j will have no knowledge about the secrets shared by the honest parties in their instances of Sh, which follows from the secrecy property of Sh. Proof The values V i1 , . . . , V i(n−2t) are defined in the step 10 of the protocol. We now prove the first part of the lemma. According to the lemma condition, P i ∈ G j . This implies that T i ⊆ T j . So the honest P j will participate in the instance Rec k , corresponding to each P k ∈ T i . Moreover, eventually T i ⊆ T m and P i ∈ G m will hold for every other honest party P m . So, every other honest party will also eventually participate in the instance Rec k corresponding to each P k ∈ T i . Now by the property of Rec, all the honest parties will eventually reconstruct S k = (x k1 , . . . , x ki , . . . , x kn ) at the completion of Rec k , except with probability at most γ , where γ =
Lemma 14
(follows from Theorem 5 by substituting = n). As there are 2t + 1 parties in the set T i , except with probability at most nγ ≤ 4n , all the honest parties will correctly have the vector X i during the step 10 and hence will associate the values V i1 , . . . , V i(n−2t) with P i .
We now prove the second part of the lemma. By Lemma 13, when T i is fixed, the values that are shared by corrupted parties in T i are completely independent of the values shared by the honest parties in T i . Now T i contains n − t parties and hence at least n − 2t honest parties and every honest partys' shared secrets are uniformly distributed and mutually independent. This implies that in the vector X i , there are at least Proof Let P i be the first honest party to broadcast the message Reconstruct Enabled. Then let M be the set of parties P k , who belong to the set G l of at least t + 1 parties P l , who are present in the set S i , when P i broadcasted the Reconstruct Enabled message. We claim that this set M has all the properties as stated in the lemma. It is clear that M ⊆ H i . Thus the party P i must have received the message (Attach T j to P j ) from the broadcast of every P j ∈ M. So this proves the first part of the lemma.
An honest P j broadcasts the message Reconstruct Enabled only when S j contains 2t + 1 parties. Now note that P k ∈ M implies that P k belongs to G l of at least t + 1 parties P l , who are present in S i . This ensures that there is at least one such P l who belongs to S j , as well as S i . Now P l ∈ S j implies that P j had ensured that G l ⊆ G j . This implies that P k ∈ M belongs to G j before the party P j broadcasted the Reconstruct Enabled message. Since H j is the instance of G j at the time when P j broadcasted the Reconstruct Enabled message, it is obvious that P k ∈ M belongs to H j also. Using a similar argument, it can be shown that every P k ∈ M also belongs to H j , thus proving the second part of the lemma.
To complete the lemma, it remains to show that |M| ≥ n 3 , for which we use a counting argument. Let m = |S i | at the time when P i broadcasted the Reconstruct Enabled message. So we have m ≥ 2t +1. Now consider an n×n table Λ i (relative to party P i ), whose l th row and kth column contains 1 for k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} if and only if the following holds: (a) P i has received the message (P l Accepts G l ) from the broadcast of P l and included P l in S i before broadcasting the Reconstruct Enabled message and (b)P k ∈ G l . The remaining entries (if any) of Λ i are left blank. Then M is the set of parties P k such that the k th column in Λ i contains 1 at least at t + 1 positions. Notice that each row of Λ i contains 1 at n − t positions. Thus Λ i contains 1 at m(n − t) positions.
Let q denote the minimum number of columns in Λ i that contain 1 at least at t + 1 positions. We will show that q ≥ n 3 .
The worst distribution of 1 entries in Λ i is letting q columns to contain all 1 entries and letting each of the remaining n −q columns to contain 1 at t locations. This distribution requires Λ i to contain 1 at no more than qm + (n − q)t positions. But we have already shown that Λ i contains 1 at m(n − t) positions. So we have
. Since m ≥ n − t and n ≥ 3t + 1, we have
This shows that |M| = q ≥ Proof By Lemma 14, for every P i that is included in the G j of some honest party P j , there exists some fixed (yet unknown) n − 2t unique values, say V i1 , . . . , V i(n−2t) , that are distributed uniformly over [0, . . . , u] and all the honest parties will associate V i1 , . . . , V i(n−2t) with P i . Since the parties have terminated the protocol MCC, this implies that the event E occurs. This further implies that with probability at least (1− 4n ), all the honest parties will agree on the values associated with every party, as this depends upon whether the instances of Sh and Rec have completed properly. Now we fix an l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2t} and consider the following two cases:
-We show that the probability of outputting σ l = 0 as the lth bit by all the honest parties is at least 1 4 . Let M be the set of parties guaranteed by Lemma 15. Clearly if V jl = 0 for some P j ∈ M and if all the honest parties associate V jl (as the lth value) with P j , then clearly all the honest parties will output σ l = 0. The probability that for at least one party P j ∈ M, the value V jl = 0 is 1 -We show that the probability of outputting σ l = 1 as the lth bit by all the honest parties is at least 1 4 . It is obvious that if no party P j has V jl = 0 and if all honest parties associate V jl with P j , then all the honest parties will output σ l = 1. As u = 0.87n , the probability of this event is at least Proof In the protocol MCC, each party executes an instance of Sh to share n secrets and the corresponding instance of Rec is executed to reconstruct the n secrets. So the communication complexity of MCC follows from Theorem 5 by substituting = n. The theorem now follows from Lemmas 12-16.
Existing voting protocol
In this section, we recall the existing vote protocol from [7] , which will be required for the construction of our ABA protocol (along with the multi-bit common coin protocol).
Informally, the voting protocol does "whatever can be done deterministically" to reach agreement. In a voting protocol, every party has a single bit as input. The protocol tries to find out whether there is a detectable majority for some value among the inputs of the parties. In the protocol, each party's output can have five different forms:
1. For σ ∈ {0, 1}, the output (σ, 2) stands for "overwhelming majority for σ "; 2. For σ ∈ {0, 1}, the output (σ, 1) stands for "distinct majority for σ "; 3. The output (Λ, 0) stands for "non-distinct majority".
The voting protocol will have the following properties:
1. If all the honest parties have the same input σ , then all the honest parties will output (σ, 2); 2. If some honest party outputs (σ, 2), then every other honest party will output either (σ, 2) or (σ, 1); 3. If some honest party outputs (σ, 1) and no honest party outputs (σ, 2) then each honest party outputs either (σ, 1) or (Λ, 0).
The voting protocol consists of three "stages", each having a similar structure. The protocol called VOTE is presented in Fig. 9 . In the protocol, party P i have the input bit x i . The properties of the protocol VOTE are stated in the following lemmas and the proofs (taken from [7] ) are available in "Appendix 2". Lemma 17 ([7] ) All the honest parties terminate the protocol VOTE in a constant time. Proof In the protocol, each party may broadcast A, B and C sets, each containing the identity of n − t parties. Since the identity of each party can be represented by log n bits, the protocol requires broadcast of O(n 2 log n) bits.
Multi-bit ABA protocol
Once we have the n −2t bit common coin protocol MCC and the VOTE protocol, we can design our multi-bit ABA protocol to reach agreement on n − 2t bits concurrently, by extending the idea used in [7] . We first informally discuss the underlying idea used in [7] for reaching agreement on a single bit by using protocol CC and VOTE; the same idea is extended in a "natural" way in our protocol for reaching agreement on n − 2t bits concurrently.
The underlying idea for agreement on a single bit: The ABA protocol (for a single bit) proceeds in "iterations", where in each iteration every party computes a "modified input" value. In the first iteration, the modified input of a party P i is its private input bit (for the ABA protocol) x i . In each iteration, the parties execute an instance of the protocol VOTE and CC sequentially, that is, a party participates in the instance of CC only after terminating the instance of VOTE (the reason for this provision will be clear while proving the properties of the ABA protocol). If a party outputs (σ, 1) in the instance of the VOTE protocol, implying that it finds a "distinct majority" for the value σ , then the party sets its modified input for the next iteration to σ , irrespective of the value which is going to be output in the instance of CC; otherwise, the party sets its modified input for the next iteration to be the output of the CC protocol, which is invoked by all the parties in each iteration, irrespective of whether the output of the CC protocol is used or not by the parties for setting the modified inputs for the next iteration. Once a party outputs (σ, 2) in an instance of the VOTE protocol, implying that it finds an "overwhelming majority" for the value σ , then it broadcasts σ . Finally, once a party receives σ from the broadcast of t + 1 parties, it outputs σ and terminates.
Extending the idea for n-2t bits: In our multi-bit ABA protocol, we extend the above idea as follows: during the first iteration, the "modified input" for each party will consists of its private n − 2t input bits, so each party will have n − 2t modified input bits. Then in each iteration, the parties execute n − 2t parallel instances of the VOTE protocol (one instance on behalf of each bit), followed by a single instance of the MCC protocol (on behalf of all the n − 2t bits). Note that a party participates in the instance of MCC only after terminating all the n − 2t instances of the VOTE protocol. A party repeats the same logic explained as above to set each of its modified bit for the next iteration taking into account the outcome of the VOTE and MCC. More specifically, after completing the iteration k, each party sets the lth bit of its modified input for the (k + 1)th iteration as follows, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2t}: if (σ l , 1) is obtained as the output of the lth instance of VOTE during the kth iteration, then the lth bit is set as σ l ; otherwise the lth bit is set as the lth output bit obtained at the end of MCC protocol during the kth iteration. This process is repeated till (σ l , 2) is obtained as the output of the lth instance of VOTE during some iteration, in which case, a party stops all computations related to the lth bit and broadcasts σ l . Our multi-bit ABA protocol, called MABA, is presented in Fig. 10 .
We now proceed to prove the properties of the protocol MABA; most of the proofs follow from the properties of the single bit ABA protocol provided in [7] , but for the sake of completeness we provide them here.
Lemma 21
In the protocol MABA, if all the honest parties have the same input (σ 1 , . . . , σ n−2t ), then all the honest parties terminate and output (σ 1 , . . . , σ n−2t ).
Proof The proof follows from the fact that if all the honest parties have the same input (σ 1 , . . . , σ n−2t ), then by Lemma 18, during the first iteration every honest party will output (y 1l , m 1l ) = (σ l , 2) upon terminating the lth instance of the VOTE protocol; consequently every honest party will broadcast (Terminate with output σ l , l).
Lemma 22
If some honest party terminates the protocol MABA with output (σ 1 , . . . , σ n−2t ), then all the honest parties will eventually terminate MABA with output (σ 1 , . . . , σ n−2t ).
Proof To prove the lemma, it is enough to show that for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2t}, if an honest party outputs σ l as the lth bit, then all the honest parties will also eventually output σ l as the lth bit. We first claim that if an honest party broadcasts (Terminate with output σ l , l), then eventually every other honest party will also do the same. Let k be the first iteration when an honest party P i broadcasts (Terminate with output σ l , l); we show that every other honest party will broadcast the same either in the kth iteration or in the (k + 1)th iteration. Since the honest P i has broadcasted (Terminate with output σ l , l) during the kth iteration, it implies that y kl = σ l and m kl = 2, which further implies that P i has obtained (σ l , 2) as the output of the lth instance of the VOTE protocol, invoked during the kth iteration. So by Lemma 19, every other honest party P j will output either (σ l , 2) or (σ l , 1) during this instance of the VOTE protocol. In case P j outputs (σ l , 2), then it will broadcast (Terminate with outputσ l , l) during the kth iteration itself. Furthermore every honest P j will execute the lth instance of the VOTE during the (k + 1)th iteration with input v (k+1)l = σ l . So clearly, during the (k + 1)th iteration, every honest party will have the same input σ l for the lth instance of VOTE. Therefore by Lemma 18, every honest party will output (σ l , 2) during this instance of the VOTE protocol. Thus all the honest parties broadcast (Terminate with output σ l , l) either during the kth iteration or during the (k + 1)th iteration. Now suppose that an honest party outputs σ l as the lth bit, so at least one honest party must have broadcasted (Terminate withoutputσ l , l) . Consequently, all the honest parties will also broadcast the same. So eventually, every honest party will receive (Terminate with outputσ l , l) from the broadcast of n − t parties and (Terminate with output σ l , l) from the broadcast of at most t corrupted parties. Therefore every honest party will output σ l as the lth bit.
Lemma 23
If all the honest parties have initiated and completed some iteration k, then for any l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2t} where flag l = 0, with probability at least 1 4 , all the honest parties will have the same lth modified input v (k+1)l for the (k + 1)th iteration. each iteration). Now the instance of MCC has an error probability of at most 4n for termination (follows from Theorem 6). Thus with probability at least 1 − 4n , all the honest parties complete the instance of MCC during the kth iteration. Therefore, for each k, Prob(C k+1 |C k ∩ τ l ≥ k) ≤ 4n . So we get Proof In each iteration of the protocol MABA, one instance of MCC and n − 2t instances of VOTE are executed, which requires a private as well as broadcast communication of O(n 4 log 1 ) bits. Moreover, from the proof of Lemma 24, there will be an (expected) constant number of such iterations. The theorem now follows from Lemmas 21-25.
Conclusion and open problems
We presented a (1 − )-terminating unconditional ABA protocol with optimal resilience, which significantly improves the communication complexity of the best known (1 − )-terminating ABA protocol of [8] . Our protocol also has better communication complexity than the almost-surely terminating ABA protocol of [1] (however the ABA protocol of [1] has a stronger property of being almost-surely terminating). The key factors that have contributed to the gain in the communication complexity of our ABA protocol are: -Using a shorter route AICP → AWC → AVSS to get our AVSS scheme and to introduce the new primitive AWC, which can be designed more efficiently that AWSS, the commonly used primitive in the AVSS of [8] and in the SVSS of [1] . -Improving each of the underlying building blocks, so as to deal with multiple values concurrently. -Modifying the existing common coin protocol to make it compatible with our AVSS scheme (sharing multiple secrets concurrently) and to generate Θ(n) common coins concurrently.
An interesting open problem is to further improve the communication complexity of our ABA protocol. Improving the communication complexity of the almost-surely terminating ABA protocol of [1] is another interesting open problem.
In that regard, it may be worth defining a "shunning" variant of AWC and investigating if the new primitive can be used to design SVSS more efficiently than the known construction. Furthermore, one can try to find the applicability of our tricks for dealing with multiple secrets concurrently in the context of the ABA of [1] . Perhaps the most challenging open problem is to get an almost-surely terminating, optimally-resilient, ABA protocol with a constant expected running time and with low communication complexity.
Proceeding further, the authors in [8] designed an AWSS scheme using their A-RS protocol. The scheme consists of two sub-protocols, namely AWSS-Share and AWSS-Rec. In the AWSS-Share protocol, D generates n (Shamir) shares of the secret and instantiates n instances of ICP for each of the n shares. Now each individual party A-RS-Share (as a D) all the values that it has received in the n instances of ICP. Since each individual party receives a total of O(nκ) field elements in the n instances of ICP, the above step incurs a private communication of O(n 4 κ 3 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 2 κ log n) bits. In the AWSS-Rec protocol, each party P i tries to reconstruct the values which are A-RS-shared by each party P j in a set E i . Here E i is a set which is defined in the AWSS-Share protocol. In the worst case, the size of each E i is O(n). So in the worst case, the AWSS-Rec protocol requires a private communication of O(n 5 κ 3 ) bits and broadcast O(n 5 κ log n) bits.
The authors then further extended their AWSS-Share protocol to Two&SumAWSS-Share protocol, where each party P i has to A-RS-Share O(nκ 2 ) field elements. So the communication complexity of Two&SumAWSS-Share is O(n 4 κ 4 ) bits of private communication and O(n 2 κ 2 log n) bits of broadcast communication.
Using Two&SumAWSS-Share and AWSS-Rec, the authors in [8] then finally deign their AVSS scheme, consisting of sub-protocols AVSS-Share and AVSS-Rec. In the AVSS-Share protocol, the most communication-expensive step is the one where each party has to reconstruct O(n 3 κ) field elements by executing instances of AWSS-Rec. So in total, the AVSS-Share protocol involves a private communication of O(n 9 κ 4 ) and broadcast of O(n 9 κ 2 log n) bits. The AVSS-Rec protocol involves n instances of AWSS-Rec, resulting in a private communication of O(n 6 κ 3 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 6 κ log n) bits. Now in the common coin protocol, each party in P acts as a dealer and invokes n instances of AVSS-Share to share n secrets. So the communication complexity of the common protocol of [8] is O(n 11 κ 4 ) bits of private communication and O(n 11 κ 2 log n) bits of broadcast communication. Now in the ABA protocol of [8] , common coin protocol is called for R = O(1) expected time. Hence the ABA protocol of [8] involves a private communication of O(n 11 κ 4 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 11 κ 2 log n) bits. As mentioned earlier, κ = O(log 1 ). Thus the ABA protocol of [8] involves a private communication of O(n 11 log( 1 ) 4 ) bits and broadcast of O(n 11 log( 1 ) 2 log n) bits.
Appendix 2: Proofs for the protocol VOTE
Proof of Lemma 17 Every honest party P i will broadcast its input x i . As there are at least n − t honest parties, from the properties of broadcast, every honest P i will eventually have |A i | = n − t and then will eventually have |B i | = n − t and finally will eventually have |C i | = n−t. Consequently, every honest P i will terminate the protocol in a constant time.
Proof of Lemma 18
Consider an honest party P i . If all the honest parties have the same input σ , then at most t (corrupted) parties may broadcast σ as their input. Therefore, it is easy to see that every P k ∈ B i must have broadcasted its vote b k = σ . Hence the honest P i will output (σ, 2).
Proof of Lemma 19
Let an honest P i outputs (σ, 2). This implies that every P j ∈ B i had broadcasted vote a j = σ . As |B i | = 2t + 1, it implies that for every other honest party P j , it holds that |B i ∩ B j | ≥ t + 1 and so P j is bound to broadcast re-vote b j = σ and hence will output either (σ, 2) or (σ, 1).
Proof of Lemma 20
Assume that an honest party P i outputs (σ, 1). This implies that all the parties P j ∈ C i had broadcasted the same re-vote b j = σ . Since |C i | ≥ n − t, in the worst case there are at most t parties (outside C i ) who may broadcast re-vote σ . Thus it is clear that no honest party will output (σ , 1). Now since the honest parties in C i had re-voted as σ , there must be at least t + 1 parties who have broadcasted their vote as σ . Thus no honest party can output (σ , 2) for which at least n − t = 2t + 1 parties are required to broadcast their vote as σ . So we have proved that no honest party will output from {(σ , 2), (σ , 1)}. Therefore the honest parties will output either (σ, 1) or (Λ, 0).
